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Abstract
Background: When a new intervention or drug is developed, this has to pass through various phases of clinical
testing before it achieves market approval, which can take many years. This raises an issue for drugs which could
benefit terminally ill patients. These patients might set their hopes on the experimental drug but are unable to wait
since they are likely to pass away before the drug is available. As a means of nevertheless getting access to
experimental drug, many seriously ill and terminally ill patients are therefore very willing to participate in
randomised controlled trials. However, only very few terminally ill patients are able to actually participate, and those
that do participate are at risk of participating solely as a way of getting experimental drugs. Currently, there are,
however, ways of getting access to drugs that have not (yet) gained market approval. One such mean is via
expanded access or compassionate use programs where terminally ill patients receive experimental new drugs that
are not yet market approved. In this paper, I examine some of the common justifications for such programs.
Main body: The most frequently voiced justifications for compassionate use or expanded access programs could
be put in one of three categories. First, there are justifications of justice, where compassionate use programs could
be seen as a just or fair way to distribute experimental new drugs to patients who are denied access to RCT’s
through no fault of their own. Second, such programs could be justified by reference to the ethical principle of
beneficence where it could be claimed that terminally ill patients stand to benefit greatly at very little risk (as they
are already dying). Third, there are considerations of autonomy where, it is claimed, patients should be able to
exercise their autonomy and have access to such drugs if that is there free choice and they are fully aware of the
risks associated with that choice.
Short conclusion: In this paper, I argue currently all justifications are potentially problematic. If they truly form the
basis for justification, compassionate use programs should be designed to maximize justice, beneficence and
autonomy.
Keywords: Research ethics, Compassionate use, Expanded access, Analysis of common justifications
Background
Imagine you have a terminal illness. Your physicians in-
forms you that in attempting to treat your illness, all
known interventions or treatments have been tried, but
have all shown to be ineffective. This effectively leaves
you without viable treatment options. This situation is a
reality for a significant amount of patients who then,
ideally, receive palliative care to attempt to provide the
best possible end of life. However, imagine your phys-
ician informs you that she is aware of a new drug that is
currently in development. This drug has had promising
results in laboratory and animal testing, and has also
undergone phase I and phase IIa testing on human par-
ticipants. Currently, a phase IIb randomised clinical trial
(RCT) is being set up. Imagine you set your hopes on
this new drug and would like to get access to it, what
are your options?
One option is to wait for the drug to get market ap-
proval and reach the market. However, such testing
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takes time. Available research suggests that the average
time from the first clinical tests on humans (phase 0 or
I) to market approval is more than 7 years [1]. Termin-
ally ill patients are thus likely to pass away before this
medical intervention reaches the market, making this an
unviable option.
Another alternative is to attempt to get enrolled in
randomised controlled trial (RCT) for the drug which
gives you a decent chance of receiving the experimental
new agent. It is not assured you receive the drug since
there is likely to be a control group receiving a placebo
or the best currently available treatment and you could
be (randomly) assigned to this group. Such clinical trials
have a strong allure for terminally ill patients, and it is
known that they will often ‘try anything to stay alive’ [2].
However, such a strong willingness of terminally ill pa-
tients potentially poses problems. First, it might make
the offer or option to participate in an RCT a coercive
one that some patients are unable to refuse. This might
invalidate free and informed consent [3], although others
have argued that this is not necessarily the case [4]. Sec-
ond, it has been argued that it might even compromise
the clinical trial system. Schuklenk (2014), for example,
uses the example of AIDS trials in the past and argues
that: ‘[Patients] lied and cheated to get into trials and left
trials in such large numbers as to threaten the viability
of the AIDS clinical trials system.’ ([5]: p.21).
As such, there is increasing attention for other ways to
provide terminally ill patients with access to experimen-
tal and innovative drugs. As argued by Schuklenk:
‘I doubt there exists currently a societal consensus
anywhere that it is acceptable to compel catastrophically
ill patients to participate in placebo controlled,
randomized, double-blind trials as the only means of
accessing investigational new agents’ ([5]: p.21).
One such mean is via expanded access programs or
compassionate use programs.
Compassionate use and expanded access programs1
In compassionate use or expanded access programs ser-
iously ill patients without access to legally marketed
drugs for their condition are granted access to experi-
mental new drugs. This often concerns drugs (e.g. oncol-
ogy drugs) in phase II or phase III of clinical trials.
Many legislations worldwide have such a recognized
system of providing seriously ill patients with as-of-yet
unapproved drugs, but regulations are known to differ
significantly between legislations [6, 7]. However, what is
common to most legislations is the condition that un-
approved drugs should only be provided to seriously ill
or dying patients and when there is some evidence of a
possible effectiveness (e.g. from a phase I trial of the
drug).
Such access to unapproved drugs for terminally ill pa-
tients outside of an RCT seems to enjoy considerable
public support. There have, for example, been several
highly mediatised cases of patients who were denied ac-
cess to a clinical trial, but who nevertheless demanded
access to the experimental drug tested in that trial. Two
famous examples are those of Abigail Burroughs [8] and
Josh Hardy [9]. There is also a growing phenomenon of
patients using the internet and social media campaigns
in an attempt to nudge pharmaceutical companies in
order to gain access to experimental new drugs. Sev-
eral online petitions for individual patients included
more than 100,000 signatures [10]. Also, a website
such as ‘Mytomorrows’ that sells access to experimen-
tal and unapproved drugs operates in 73 countries
and currently has almost 4000 registered patients
[11]. Partly because of the public support, a total of
24 US states have passed (or are in the process of
passing) so called ‘Right-to-Try Laws’, that make ex-
plicit the right of seriously ill patients (under certain
strict conditions) to receive interventions or drugs
that have not yet received market approval [12, 13].
Categorization of the arguments
However, despite the significant public support, compas-
sionate use has been the focus of considerable debate. In
this paper I try to shed light on the issue by bundling
key justifications for compassionate use or expanded ac-
cess. For each justification I attempt to see whether and
when such justifications might be valid.
Looking at the justifications found in international lit-
erature, I believe them to fall within one of three broad
categories. Some justifications apply to the ethical
principle of justice, others refer to the principle of ben-
eficence and, finally, some invoke the principle of auton-
omy. Each of these categories will be elaborated on
below. Using these categories, I believe, provides a good
perspective for reviewing the current debate on compas-
sionate use.
My choice for the categories of justice, beneficence
and autonomy is motivated by the fact that they are all
widely recognized as ethical principles. Moreover they
constitute broad categories and are not necessarily tied
to a single ethical framework. These categories or princi-
ples are therefore able to serve as a heading to capture
different specific arguments.
The use of a broad framework is also immediately
relevant for this paper in which I will, in various places,
compare compassionate use programs with randomised
controlled trials (RCT’s). It may be argued that compar-
ing both could be problematic as compassionate use is
part of clinical practice and thus differs in relevant ways
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from the research context of RCT’s. This will not be ex-
panded upon since discussing all the similarities and dif-
ferences between research and clinical practice does not
fall under the scope of this paper [14]. However, despite
the possible differences, both clinical practice and re-
search are (or should be) guided by these three ethical
principles. Hence regardless of whether one sees re-
search and clinical practice as requiring different ethical
frameworks, comparison becomes possible by referring
to shared principles.
Main text
First justification for compassionate use programs: justice
and/or fairness
A first possible justification for compassionate use pro-
grams refers to the ethical principle of justice or fairness.
Of course, many different approaches to justice exist
(e.g. distributive, egalitarian, libertarian, etc.). However,
as the label ‘justice’ is used here as a broad category to
cover possible justifications for compassionate use, the
concept will not be further specified here.
Consequences of the current system
As mentioned above, it may be an option for terminally
ill patients who set their hopes on an innovative new
drug to try to get enrolled in an RCT. One may become
aware of such ongoing trials through health care profes-
sionals, but it is also possible for patients to search for
clinical trials online via open clinical trials registries or
websites such as ‘MyTomorrows’ [11].
However, despite the strong desire of some terminally
ill patients to receive experimental drugs by participating
in randomised controlled trials, only a few will be able
to actually participate. First, phase I and II clinical trials
often do not include many participants, so that only a
selected number of terminally ill patients who want to
participate can actually do so. Second, for a great deal of
patients the clinical trial for a certain drug might not be
conducted in their vicinity. Going long distances to par-
ticipate in a trial might be an option for a determined
patient, but is often difficult for a terminally ill patient
who might be in poor physical condition.
Third, many seriously ill patients will not fit the inclu-
sion criteria for a trial. In most clinical trials a significant
amount of potential participants is excluded, in order to
create a homogeneous group. Patients in poor physical
condition are often excluded (as they might die before
the completion of the study or are taking too many
other drugs (creating confounding factors), etc.). Some
research suggests that the rate of exclusion for phase I
trials based on poor physical state can be 20 % [15] and
even up to 35 % [16]. In general, those worst off (e.g.
those with a rapidly progressing illness) are most likely
to be denied participation. In other cases, a clinical trial
might be aimed at a particular condition or medical
problem, thereby excluding patients with other (similar)
conditions. This was the case in the famous Abigail Bur-
rough case where an American student diagnosed with
head and neck cancer was unable to participate in a clin-
ical trial, since the trial was restricted to patients with
colon cancer. Her father, Frank Burroughs, considered
this unfair and (unsuccessfully) sued the FDA.
It is also important to remark that not all patients who
do participate in the clinical trial, actually receive the ex-
perimental drug, as most clinical trial consist of a con-
trol group that receives a placebo or best available
treatment. Since we are here concerned with terminally
ill patients, there is unlikely to be a best available treat-
ment, so it will mostly concern a placebo control group.
Recently, a new issue with inclusion and exclusion
arose when Uppsala University started a clinical trial for
a drug for patients with neuroendocrine cancer. For this
trial, an American millionaire diagnosed with neuroen-
docrine cancer provided considerable funding in ex-
change for participation in the trial. In a way, this
patient bought his way into the trial, thereby also
bypassing randomisation, as he would be allocated to
the intervention group. Researchers who are part of this
trial are now trying to explore whether it is possible to
create a system where rich patients fund clinical trials in
exchange for participation [17].
In short, whether patients who set their hopes on a
certain innovative drug are able to participate in a cer-
tain trial is determined by various factors outside of the
patient’s control: distance to the trial, the number of par-
ticipants allowed in the trial, the condition on which the
drug is tested, the patient’s physical condition. In the
case of the Uppsala University trial it also dependent on
one’s wealth. Of course, as correctly pointed out by a re-
viewer, that participation depends at least partly on fac-
tors beyond one’s control does not necessarily make it
unfair. For example, trials have to be conducted some-
where and so will, by necessity, take place close to some
patients and further away from others. In other cases ex-
clusion of some patients might be grounded and justified
to guarantee the scientific rigour and validity of a trial.
However, regardless of the fairness, inherent to the strict
methodology of RCT’s is that a great deal of patients will
be denied access.
Compassionate use or expanded access programs
One might argue that compassionate use or expanded
access programs could provide a fair way of distributing
experimental drugs to patients who, through no fault of
their own, are excluded from participating in trials. In
compassionate use programs, access to the drug depends
less on one’s geographical location, as drugs can be
shipped and there is less monitoring involved. Via
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compassionate use programs, drugs could also be sup-
plied to patients in poor physical condition who are now
mostly excluded from participation.
However, as mentioned above, pharmaceutical com-
panies are free to refuse providing drugs in the compas-
sionate use program, and refusal currently does not have
to be justified. If drug companies agree to a compassion-
ate use program, they are therefore allowed to allocate
the drugs in any way they see fit. The FDA in its com-
munication with patients, for example, reports that:
The [drug] company may not have enough of the drug
available for all patients requesting expanded access.
Some companies establish a lottery system to
determine which patients will have treatment access.
Others make the decision on a case-by-case basis [18].
Therefore, according to most current legislation, a
compassionate use program might result in more people
obtaining the experimental drug, but there is currently
no guarantee that the drug is allocated in a way that is
consistent or fair. As mentioned earlier, some cases are
heavily mediatised and some patients conduct successful
social media campaigns that could result in getting a
pharmaceutical company to grant their request [10]. In
such cases, drugs are being distributed to those who are
fortunate to have their case mediatised or whose online
campaign is successful. It is also possible to purchase ex-
perimental drugs online, in which case the service is
available to those who can afford them.
Some companies are considering ethical ways to han-
dle compassionate use requests. Quite recently Janssen
has created a Compassionate Use Advisory Committee
(CompAC) which contains physicians, bioethicists, pa-
tients and patient representatives and advises on com-
passionate use requests [19]. This indicates that
compassionate use programs could be designed to guar-
antee fairness in allocation and are thus not inherently
unfair. I would argue that one can only justify compas-
sionate use by reference to justice or fairness if the dis-
tribution of drugs is guaranteed to be fair or just. As
pharmaceutical companies are now free to distribute
compassionate use drug, it is highly questionable
whether this condition is fulfilled. Forcing companies
participating in compassionate use programs to use a
well thought out and fair process of distribution would
be a good idea, in my opinion.
Alternatives
Even if RCT’s are not the best way to do test drugs that
might benefit terminally ill (because of the presence of a
placebo control group or the limited number of partici-
pants), compassionate use programs do not constitute
the only alternative. As mentioned earlier, designing and
testing a drug is a lengthy process, but there might be
ways to speed up the drug approval process. For ex-
ample by using a Expansion Cohort Design where, in-
stead of conducting different phase I, II and III studies,
one adds cohorts to the initial first-in-human trial based
on the incoming data [20, 21]. This potentially allows for
more flexibility and takes up considerably less time. If
the time-to-approval is significantly reduced, waiting for
a drug to be approved may indeed become a viable op-
tion for more terminally ill patients.
Another might be to use ‘n-of-1’ trials. In such single
patients trials, patients might receive experimental new
drugs, but data is gathered in a more scientific way than
in most current compassionate use programs [22]. In
this way, we provide early access but we do not ‘abandon
our commitment to well-designed, well-conducted clin-
ical trials’ ([20]: 2003).
Alternative designs might, off course, also be possible
[23]. Relevant here is the fact that even if one argues
that RCT’s are ethically suboptimal when it concerns
terminally ill patients, several alternatives to compas-
sionate use programs are also viable and might even
pose considerable advantages.
Second justification for compassionate use programs:
beneficence
The justification for compassionate use programs seems
to be that providing seriously ill patients with experi-
mental drugs provides them with benefits and could save
or prolong their lives.
However, this assumption could be considered ques-
tionable. There seem to be two types of risk. First, there
is a direct risk for the intervention or pharmaceutical
compound one takes to have harmful effects on patients.
Second, there is a risk that by participation in the com-
passionate use programs patients are exploited for the
benefit of researchers or pharmaceutical companies.
Risks of harmful side-effects
The ingestion of experimental drugs is fraught with risks
and it is known that only a very small percentage of
drugs that are clinically tested on humans actually end
up being marketed [24]. Therefore, it is highly possible
that the drug being given is actually harmful or ineffect-
ive. For example, research suggests that of all oncology
drugs that enter phase I, only about 26 % ends up get-
ting approved, for oncology drugs entering phase II and
II this is, respectively, 34 and 57 % [25]. Even for drugs
that make it to phase III, a significant amount never
make it to the market. It is highly uncertain whether
governments or health insurance companies are willing
to cover health costs resulting from unapproved drugs.
As such seriously ill patients taking such drugs run sig-
nificant health and financial risks.
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Moreover, risks are not limited to a directly harmful
effect of the investigational drug or intervention, as there
might, for example, also be other financial harm. Some
drugs might be ineffective. If, as is the case in some
countries, patients in compassionate use programs pay
pharmaceutical companies for these drugs, terminally ill
patients, who are often already financially burdened, risk
additional financial burdens for a drug that does not
work properly or does not work at all.
Of course, even taking market approved drugs is al-
ways potentially risky. Drugs that are approved for mar-
ket have been successfully tested in RCT’s, but most
patients in clinical practice do not fulfil the RCT inclu-
sion criteria. One should therefore be careful not to
overstate benefits for every individual patient of an ap-
proved drug. Even approved drugs do not work (prop-
erly) in a significant number of patients [26] or might
result in severe adverse events. Therefore, stating that
unapproved drugs are always dangerous whereas ap-
proved drugs are safe and effective is an oversimplifica-
tion and wrong on an individual patient level.
Nevertheless, although obtaining market approval is not
a perfect guarantee for safety and effectivity, it at least
provides some guarantees of being safe and effective on
a population level.
Naturally, harmful side effect can also occur in clinical
trials. However, such trials are small scale and closely
monitored. This differs from compassionate use pro-
grams where, currently there is often no duty to report
side-effects [6]. Also, should any dramatic side-effects
occur during a clinical trial, this is limited to participants
in that clinical trial, all of whom are (or should be)
under close medical observation and clinical trials can
also be stopped when necessary.
It is also important to note that there is a significant
difference between compassionate use programs (which
are clinical practice) and RCT’s (which are research). In
RCT’s individual participant risks are balanced not only
against individual benefits, but also against the scientific
and social value of the results of the research study for
other patients in similar situations. This could justify
some individual risks. In compassionate use programs
(being clinical practice) one has an obligation solely to-
wards the individual patient, making harm or risks of
harm potentially less acceptable.
Risk of exploitation
In compassionate use programs, one should be attentive
to the potential of exploitation [27, 28], as there seems
to be a risk that seriously ill patients could be used for
financial gain or as cheap and easy research subjects.
First, it varies considerably from legislation to legisla-
tion whether pharmaceutical companies providing ex-
perimental drugs via compassionate use programs can
charge patients. When drugs have to be provided free of
charge, it is claimed, drug companies are unlikely to par-
ticipate in a compassionate use program. Either they do
not have a large supply of an experimental new drug, or
they are afraid of bad publicity should the drug prove
unsafe or ineffective [29, 30]. Allowing companies to
charge money then functions to overcome that reluc-
tance, as for example argued by Darrow (2015):
For example, a manufacturer’s reluctance to provide
product because of financial concerns could be addressed
by permitting companies to charge amounts closer to the
likely postapproval cost of drugs ([31]: p.285).
An alternative approach that has been suggested, is to
put all profit made by pharmaceutical companies partici-
pating in compassionate use programs on an interest-
bearing account until approval is granted [32]. If the
drug does not end up getting approved, the money on
the account can be redistributed to health related pro-
jects. First, however, knowing what the profit is, requires
pharmaceutical companies to report on the actual cost
of developing and producing the drug, which is highly
unlikely to happen. Second, in this scenario patients
would still be charged money for a drug that is in no
way guaranteed to be safe or effective. Third, for those
drugs that eventually get approved, pharmaceutical com-
panies could start making money before market approval
is even granted.
In various other countries, such as Belgium, drugs pro-
vided via compassionate use programs should always be
free of charge. This could avoid the danger of patients
being exploited. However, such a risk still exist as, for
example, websites do offer access to experimental drugs
at a charge. This legal requirement is avoided by not
selling directly to the patient.
Second, there is a risk that in compassionate use pro-
grams (terminally ill) patients are used as easy research
participants. Compassionate use falls under clinical prac-
tice, but arguments have been made that those patients
participating in a compassionate use program have a
limited obligation to share some essential data (e.g. re-
garding the effect and any adverse events) [33]. In fact,
in an increasing amount of cases, the results of compas-
sionate use programs are reported as studies. However,
as compassionate use programs are often not regulated
the same way as clinical trials are, they might be less
strict, which is a risk for patient safety. It might also be
less costly as instead of paying participants (which often
happens in clinical trials), participants of a compassion-
ate use program do not receive any money and, in those
countries where this is allowed, may even pay pharma-
ceutical companies for the drug. There is thus a fear that
pharmaceutical companies may regard compassionate
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use programs as an easy way to do research, thereby po-
tentially putting patients at risk:
Blurring the lines between expanded access and
clinical trials risks that expanded access programmes
are undertaken as an easy way to collect information
on new medicinal products instead of conducting
randomised clinical trials. When this happens, the
safeguards inherent to clinical trials, eg, having a
control group, securing insurance to protect the
patients, reporting all adverse events, reporting the
results, etc. are all circumvented ([6]: p.7-8).
This might in turn also blur the line between clinical
practice and research. If one frames such a program as
clinical practice, but uses it as a way to gather
generalizable scientific data this constitutes research and
it should follow the ethical standards for research.
If one indeed justifies compassionate use programs be
reference to the principle of beneficence, they should be
designed to provide maximum benefit and minimal
risks. If pharmaceutical companies are allowed to charge
patients money or use them as research participants for
the company’s benefit, there is a significant risk of ex-
ploitation. Hence I would argue that if the principle of
beneficence indeed justifies compassionate use pro-
grams, it justifies programs where drugs are provided
free of charge and the program is set up as clinical prac-
tice focussing on the individual patient.
The case for palliative and/or dying patients
Above it has been questioned whether, overall, compas-
sionate use is for the benefit of the patient, considering
the risks associated with it. One could nonetheless main-
tain that palliative and/or dying patients constitute an ex-
ception. These patients are sure to pass away if they are
not given the experimental drug so it could be argued that
even though the chance of a benefit is small, so are the
risks for palliative and/or dying patients. Walker et al.
(2014), for example, argue that the most common argu-
ment for denying patients unproven medication relies on
a precautionary principle that we are unaware of potential
harms of experimental new drugs. They remark, however,
that ‘this principle loses at least some of its moral force in
cases where patients are otherwise at high risk of death or
serious disability’ ([33]: p.5).
However, I believe this underestimates the possible
harms palliative and/or dying patients could suffer. First,
such patients are still at risk of being exploited, regard-
less of their prognosis. Second, even palliative and/or
dying patients can be directly harmed, for example by
spending their last days in unnecessary pain and agony
[34, 35]. Finally, as argued above, there is also a financial
risk. Compassionate use programs might cause already
financially burdened patients to spend money on drugs
that do not work. Some commentators have therefore
argued that the fact that terminally ill patients face cer-
tain death does not do away with the ethical obligation
to maximize benefit and minimize harm [36]. In com-
passionate use the physician’s ethical obligation does not
differ from standard clinical practice where treatment is
also associated with risks. In some cases where the risk
of harm is disproportional to the potential benefit (as
might be the case with drugs that are still being tested),
this might, in my view, mean refusing to provide the pa-
tient with such an experimental drug.
Third justification for compassionate use programs:
autonomy
It may also be argued that providing terminally ill pa-
tients with another option to receive an experimental
drug (besides RCT’s) could promote autonomy and
make those RCT’s more ethical. Kodish (1991), for ex-
ample, argued that clinical trials are only ethically justi-
fied if the intervention or drug in the clinical trial is also
available outside of the RCT [3]. If an intervention or
treatment is available both within and outside of a clin-
ical trial, participants can freely chose to participate in
either the RCT or the compassionate use program.
Schuklenk therefore argues that not providing experi-
mental drugs via compassionate use programs may
amount to ‘coercing dying people into participating in
particular trial designs’ ([37]: p.2). As such, compassion-
ate use programs could result in a net gain in autonomy
as it provides patients with two options where they pre-
viously had only one coercive option.
Two remarks might be made in response to this argu-
ment. The first is that there is a difference between a
tempting offer and a coercive one. As already argued
above, there is no doubt that many terminally ill patients
are willing to try anything and that an offer to partici-
pate in an RCT is tempting. A study by Agrawal et al.
(2006) into patients’ decision making regarding enrolling
in phase I clinical trials found that: ‘More than 90 % of
patients said they would still participate in the study
even if the experimental drug caused serious adverse ef-
fects, including a 10 % chance of dying’ ([38]: p.4479).
This suggests that many terminally ill patients are in-
deed willing to undergo great risks for a small glimmer
of hope. For terminally ill patients, the background con-
dition that they will inevitable pass away might make the
offer coercive, but this is not necessarily the case. What
makes offers coercive has been the topic of great debate
[39], and whether or not an offer to participate in an
RCT is coercive is not self-evident.
A second response is that the argument that compas-
sionate use programs raise autonomy is only valid if and
when patients do indeed get access to innovative drugs.
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As was already mentioned above, drug companies are al-
ways free to refuse to provide experimental drugs. Mere
FDA or EMA approval and a hypothetical access to ex-
perimental drugs or interventions could hardly be said
to raise autonomy for patients.
Regardless of whether or not autonomy is increased
with compassionate use programs, the principle remains
of great importance in justifying the practice. A commonly
voiced argument in favour of compassionate use programs
or early access to experimental drugs is that despite the
potential risks, terminally ill patients should be able to
freely choose to undergo such risks for the hope of im-
proving their condition or lengthening survival [31]. Ter-
minally ill patients are deemed capable to consent to
participate in randomised clinical trials, including trials to
test experimental drugs [40]. It could therefore be argued
that they should also be deemed capable to consent to re-
ceiving experimental drugs (with all the risks associated
with that consent). Automatically denying terminally ill
patients the capacity for consent based on their medical
condition seems paternalistic and unfounded.
However, there seem to be several red flags regarding
autonomy or informed consent in the case of compas-
sionate use programs. The first is that autonomy in ter-
minally ill patients might be threatened by therapeutic
optimism, especially in compassionate use programs. A
second red flag or concern is that, unlike in an RCT, in
a compassionate use program there is no central organ
monitoring or overseeing consent.
First of all, compassionate use programs avoid the risk
of therapeutic misconception, as, unlike in a clinical trial,
the main goal of such a program is indeed therapeutic.
There is, however, a serious risk of therapeutic optimism.
Especially since a compassionate use program is not
framed as ‘research’, thereby potentially causing partici-
pants to overlook or fail to understand the experimental
nature of the drug. Much research has been done into
hope, therapeutic misconception and therapeutic opti-
mism [41, 42]. Generally most commentators seem to
agree that while therapeutic misconception and opti-
mism pose challenges for informed consent, they do not
automatically invalidate informed consent [40]. It, how-
ever, remains an issue to monitor.
Second, in a compassionate use program there is often
no central organ monitoring the consent process which
runs via individual physicians. In Australia, for example,
compassionate use programs are not seen as research
and rarely go through a human research ethics commit-
tee. There is then no committee which oversees or
checks the consent procedure. In fact, it has been sug-
gested that this is deliberate and that ‘data collection is
often kept to a minimum in order to avoid the need for
such review’ [43]. Therefore, there is no real control over
whether or not patients under the compassionate use
program freely consent and truly understand the risks
associated with such participation [44].
Hence, for the principle of autonomy to provide an ad-
equate justification, measures should be taken to guarantee
autonomy for patients. This means monitoring the quality
and validity of informed consents given and being attentive
to the possibility of excessive therapeutic optimism.
Conclusions
In this paper the arguments given in favour of compas-
sionate use or expanded access programs have been put
into three broad categories. Compassionate use pro-
grams could be justified by claiming that they allow for a
fair distribution of experimental drugs to patients with
no other means to access the drug. Such compassionate
use programs could also be justified by appealing to the
ethical principle of beneficence. Terminally ill patients,
one could argue, stand to benefit greatly and risk rela-
tively little (as they are already facing inevitable death).
In this case even a small benefit (e.g. a small chance of
recovery or extended life-expectancy) outweighs the
(small or non-existent) risks. Last, for the justification of
compassionate use or expanded access programs appeals
could be made to autonomy. Terminally ill patients are
autonomous and are able to give free and informed con-
sent. If terminally ill patients, the argument goes, freely
take on the risks of an experimental drug for the chance
of great benefit, who are we to refuse them?
However, I have argued that – currently – appeals to
justice and beneficence are highly problematic. Pharma-
ceutical companies are, according to most current legisla-
tions, free to distribute drugs in compassionate use
programs as they see fit. There is thus no guarantee that
compassionate use or expanded access programs distrib-
ute drugs in a fair or equal way. Appeals to beneficence
could, it was argued, be equally problematic. The assump-
tion that terminally ill patients stand to lose little to noth-
ing is questionable as they might be directly harmed,
either physically (e.g. by spending their last days in agony)
or financially (e.g. by paying a significant amount of
money for an ineffective or unsafe drug). Such patients
might also be harmed by being exploited as a source of
money or as a source of easy research data.
Another way to justify compassionate use is by ref-
erence to the principle of autonomy. Terminally ill
patients are effectively left without little viable options
and refusing them to freely and autonomously con-
sent to receiving an experimental drug could even de-
prive them of their last option. Patients, it could be
argued, might be willing to take an experimental drug
in full awareness of the risks associated with undergo-
ing such a drug. Nevertheless, the possibility of thera-
peutic optimism does pose a risk for informed
consent. This is combined with the fact that in
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compassionate use of expanded access programs there
is generally no central organ monitoring the process
and quality of informed consent. This means that al-
though autonomy could provide justification, in prac-
tice there is little guarantee that terminally ill patients
do indeed make fully autonomous decisions.
As such, I argue that if compassionate use is to be
justified by reference to justice, beneficence and au-
tonomy, measures must be taken to justify this refer-
ence. Companies participating in compassionate use
programs should perhaps be required to distribute the
experimental drugs fairly. Measures should also be
taken to maximize benefits for patients and minimize
risks. This could mean providing experimental drugs
free of charge and setting up the compassionate use
program as clinical practice and not as research. Fi-
nally for the principle of autonomy to justify compas-
sionate use, measures should be taken to guarantee
the validity and non-coercive nature of the informed
consent given by those receiving experimental drugs.
Currently, however, I believe compassionate use pro-
grams are not as just, not as beneficent and not as
autonomous as they could and should be.
Endnote
1‘Both terms are synonyms used by different instances.
For the remainder of this paper, I will adopt the term
‘compassionate use’.
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